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Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis,
Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of
Traditional Comparative Law
The legal origins thesis—the thesis that legal origin impacts eco-
nomic growth and the common law is better for economic growth than
the civil law—has created hundreds of papers and citation numbers
unheard of among comparative lawyers. The Doing Business re-
ports—cross-country comparisons including rankings on the
attractiveness of different legal systems for doing business—have the
highest circulation numbers of all World Bank Publications; even crit-
ics admit that they have been successful at inciting legal reform in
many countries in the world. Yet, traditional comparative lawyers
have all but ignored these developments.
This ignorance has at least three negative consequences. First, the
economic debate will continue to ignore or misrepresent traditional
comparative law knowledge if we do not bring our specific knowledge
to the table. Second, comparative law as a discipline misses the oppor-
tunity to measure its own progress and shortcomings in view of a
literature which, although on its face radically different, provides im-
portant challenges. This concerns especially the promises and
shortcomings of interdisciplinarity. Third, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, our silence means that comparative law as a field remains (or
increasingly becomes) irrelevant for political projects because its
themes are discussed more and more by others. If we comparative law-
yers want to retain (or regain) relevance, we need to bring our
particular expertise to bear on projects as important as law reform.
The first purpose of this essay is to introduce the legal origins
literature to traditional comparative law and to show important con-
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remarks made at an AALS panel that the interest groups on comparative law and on
law and economics jointly organized in January 2009 in order to spur a dialogue be-
tween lawyer-economists and comparative lawyers on this literature. I thank Ed
Morrison, 2008 chair of the law and economics interest group, for the smooth coor-
ganization of the panel, and Richard Buxbaum, Vivian Grosswald Curran, Be´ne´dicte
Fauvarque-Cosson, Anne-Julie Kerhuel, Curtis Milhaupt, John Reitz, and Holger
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nections to the traditional themes of our discipline. A second purpose
is to examine both what particular critique of this literature emerges
from the knowledge of traditional comparative law and where tradi-
tional comparative law itself can learn from this literature. A third
purpose, finally, is to consider the continuing relevance of comparative
law. Will it be replaced by economics and statistics? Or is there a
value specific to comparative law that cannot be supplanted?
I. INTRODUCTION
What is the most important development in comparative law you
have never heard of? If you are a traditional comparative lawyer,
chances are the answer is: the legal origins thesis and the Doing Bus-
iness reports. The legal origins thesis—the thesis that the common
law is better for economic growth than the civil law—has created
hundreds of papers and citation numbers unheard of among compar-
ative lawyers.1 The Doing Business reports—cross-country
comparisons including rankings of the attractiveness of different le-
gal systems for doing business—have the highest circulation
numbers of all World Bank Publications; even critics admit that they
have been successful at inciting legal reform in many countries in the
world.
It should be obvious that both the legal origins thesis and the
Doing Business reports are of the highest interest for comparative
law. They take on central issues of our discipline: the difference be-
tween civil and common law, the transplantation of laws, the
functionality of different laws. Indeed, lawyers have responded.
There have been significant reactions from commercial law scholars,
some of whom have accepted the thesis of the superior common law
with little trepidation.2 There have also been reactions from the
(reemerging) field of law and development.3 Finally, area studies, in
particular experts on Asian law, have provided mostly critical re-
sponses.4 Traditional comparative lawyers by contrast, seem to think
that this debate research has nothing to do with us.5 Comparative
1. Mathias Siems, Book Review, 12 ED. L. REV. 334 (2008).
2. For a more critical perspective, see Mark Roe, Legal Origin and Modern Stock
Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006) (arguing for politics instead of legal origins as
causal factor).
3. See also the contributions to a forthcoming symposium issue of the Brigham
Young University Law Review on the topic “Evaluating Legal Origins Theory.”
4. E.g. John K.M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Devel-
opment Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
(2007); Curtis Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking Law’s Relationship to the
Economy—Implications for Policy, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 831 (2009); and the famous
spoof by Mark West, Legal Determinants of World Cup Success (2002), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=318940.
5. The most comprehensive exceptions are Mathias Siems, Legal Origins: Recon-
ciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 55 (2007); Mathias
Siems, Statistische Rechtsvergleichung, 37 RABELSZ 354 (2008).
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law textbooks do not mention the new literature at all. Even more
strikingly, comparative law texts on special subjects—legal families
and traditions, comparative law and economics, legal transplants and
reception—almost unanimously ignore this literature. This is true for
survey texts in comparative law encyclopedias and handbooks, but
also for the vast majority of other books and articles.
One can speculate about the reasons for this omission: the litera-
ture may not be known; it may be considered to belong to economics
rather than to comparative law; it may be viewed as so seriously defi-
cient that it does not even deserve mentioning. Be that as it may, this
ignorance has at least three negative consequences. First, the eco-
nomic debate will continue to ignore or misrepresent traditional
comparative law knowledge if we do not bring our specific knowledge
to the table. Second, comparative law as a discipline misses the op-
portunity to measure its own progress and shortcomings in view of a
literature which, although on its face radically different, provides im-
portant challenges. This concerns especially the promises and
shortcomings of interdisciplinarity. Third, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, our silence means that comparative law as a field remains (or
increasingly becomes) irrelevant for political projects because its
themes are discussed more and more by others. If we comparative
lawyers want to retain (or regain) relevance, we need to bring our
particular expertise to bear on projects as important as law reform.
The first purpose of this essay is to introduce the legal origins
literature to traditional comparative law and to show important con-
nections to the traditional themes of our discipline. A second purpose
is to examine both what particular critique of this literature emerges
from the knowledge of traditional comparative law and where tradi-
tional comparative law itself can learn from this literature. A third
purpose, finally, is to consider the continuing relevance of compara-
tive law. Will it be replaced by economics and statistics? Or is there a
value specific to comparative law that cannot be supplanted?
The article first presents the academic legal origins literature
and the Doing Business reports of the World Bank, as well as reac-
tions to both and responses to these reactions (II). In the next, main,
section, it discusses connections between the literature and several
themes of traditional comparative law: the functional method and the
common core approach, the role of legal families and traditions, the
problem of commensurability and evaluation of legal systems, and
the issues of legal transplants and law reform (III). Finally, the arti-
cle discusses what comparative law can learn from the new methods
discussed and from their astonishing political success (IV).
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II. FROM LEGAL ORIGINS TO DOING BUSINESS
A. Legal Origins
1. Presentation
The so-called legal origins thesis has emerged from the work,
since 1997, of a relatively small number of economists, often referred
to by their last name initials as LLSV or LLS. The thesis was first
developed in the comparably narrow area of investor protection.6 It
has since been broadened into a theory that contains essentially two
elements.
The first element is that “law matters”: legal institutions have an
impact on economic growth. This is in tune with neoclassical law and
economics, which is based essentially on the idea that law should be
measured by the incentives it sets for welfare-maximizing conduct. In
this generality, the idea sounds uncontroversial, particularly to law-
yers who believe, as do comparatists following Zweigert and Ko¨tz,
that what matters about the law is its functionality7 and that “law is
social engineering.”8 Yet the idea of legal engineering was doubtful
already in the 1960s (i.e., around the time when Konrad Zweigert
developed his methodology) among members of the first law and de-
velopment school—mainly lawyers—who were frustrated with the
limited success of law reform.9 More recently, however, faith in the
transformative power of law has been revived, especially among econ-
omists.10 Still, there remains a methodological problem: even if rich
countries have better laws, it is hard to determine whether these
countries are rich because they have good laws and institutions, or
whether they have good laws and institutions because they are rich
6. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert W.
Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. OF FINANCE 1131 (1997); Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
7. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KO¨TZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34
(3d ed. 1996); for the epistemological basis, see Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method
of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 364-66
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
8. ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, id. at 45 (3d ed. 1996). The earliest version of the chapter
with the “current trends in legal science” (id.) it describes dates from 1960: Konrad
Zweigert, Me´thodologie du droit compare´, in I ME´LANGES OFFERTS A` JACQUES MAURY
579 (1960). The idea of the lawyer as social engineer is borrowed from the early days
of sociological jurisprudence; see Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36
HARV.L.REV. 940, 954–58 (1923). See now also LEGAL ENGINEERING AND COMPARATIVE
LAW (2 Vols., Eleanor Cashin-Ritaine ed., 2008-09).
9. The classical U.S. account is David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the
United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062; see also John Henry Merryman, Comparative
Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and
Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977); and now Kevin E. Davis &
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship between Law and Development: Optimists ver-
sus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, esp. 915-38 (2008).
10. Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 898-915. R
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and can afford them, or whether both wealth and good laws are both
due to some third factor.11 Law is so interwoven with society that it
cannot easily be separated. This is, of course, a challenge also for
comparative law, especially for the functional method.12 The inge-
nious idea of LLSV was to look at settings in which law was not co-
original with society but instead was imposed as an external factor.
They found such settings in the context of colonization, where law
was not imported by local power elites but instead imposed externally
by the colonizing power, with a random distribution of different legal
systems depending on which European country colonized parts of the
non-European world.
This research led LLSV to the second important element of their
theory: legal origins matter. The legal institutions are a function of
the origins of the legal system, in particular in the civil law or the
common law tradition. Taking these two elements together, this
means that legal origin impacts economic growth. More controver-
sially, countries that adopted the common law perform, overall,
better than those with a civil law origin. Two types of reasons are
given for the superiority of the common law over the civil law.13 One
reason (the “political channel”) is that judges are said to be more in-
dependent in common law than in civil law systems, so that the
government has less influence on market developments. The other
reason (the “adaptability channel”) is that the common law, with its
foundation in the development of case law rather than in legislative
texts, is deemed more adaptive to changing societal requirements.
2. Reactions and Developments
The impact of this line of research has been enormous. Over
time, its authors have expanded their focus from the original rela-
tively narrow field of investor protection to a wide variety of areas, as
seen in the graph on page 770. The thesis and the underlying re-
search contributed two new fields—law and finance, and new
comparative economics14—that have been joined by an enormous
number of scholars. Their ideas have also been picked up by lawyers.
11. Holger Spamann, Large-Sample, Quantitative Research Designs for Compara-
tive Law?, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 797, at 806 (2009); for a survey of attempts to overcome
the problem, see Andrew Williams & Abu Siddique, The Use (and Abuse) of Govern-
ance Indicators in Economics: A Review, 9 ECON. OF GOVERNANCE 131, 150-52 (2008).
12. E.g. Gu¨nter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative
Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 440 (1985).
13. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law and Finance: Why
does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653 (2003).
14. Simeon Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON.
595 (2003); Bruno Dallago, Comparative Economic Systems and the New Comparative
Economics, 1 EUR. J. COMP. ECON. 59 (2004); Peter J. Boettke et al., The New Compar-
ative Political Economy, 18 REV. AUSTR. ECON. 281 (2005).
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Legal Origin
Time to Evict Nonpaying Tenant
Time to Collect a Bounced Check
Property Rights
Corruption
Unofficial Economy
Participation Rates
Unemployment
Stock Market Development
Firm Valuation
Ownership Structure
Control Premium
Private credit
Interest Rate Spread
Regulation of Entry
Procedural Formalism
Judicial Independence
Government Ownership
of the Media
Labor Laws
Conscription
Company Law
Securities Law
Bankruptcy Law
Government Ownership
of Banks
Institution Outcomes
La Porta et al. (2008) at 292
At the same time, almost every element of the original thesis has
come under serious attack. In particular, the coding of countries in-
vestigated is being criticized—the 1997 paper has been shown to rest
on erroneous coding; properly recoded, the superiority of common law
origins could no longer be demonstrated.15 Also, the thesis that legal
origins are truly exogenous to legal systems turned out to be problem-
atic.16 Finally, the claim that the common law causes growth has
been criticized so heavily that LLS themselves now appear to back off
from it to some extent.
In response to such criticism, three authors of LLS co-authored
an extremely accessible survey article on the legal origins thesis.17 In
this article, they accept some of the criticism but maintain the essen-
tial elements of their original thesis. Most importantly, they reject
alternative explanations that legal origins are merely proxies for
15. Holger Spamann, The ‘Anti-Director Rights Index’ Revisited, REV. FIN. STUD.
Advance Access published Sept. 14, 2009. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp067.
16. John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Coun-
try Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
579, at 591-92 (2009).
17. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J.
ECON. LIT. 285 (2008).
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other, non-legal factors, especially culture, politics, and history. In
the process, however, their understanding of legal origins has become
very broad; it now encompasses human capital and the beliefs of the
respective participants. The authors now define “[l]egal origins as a
style of social control of economic life” where “common law stands for
the strategy of social control that seeks to support private market
outcomes, whereas civil law seeks to replace such outcomes with
state-desired allocations.”18  This suggests that what the authors are
looking for is, ultimately, something other than law.
B. Doing Business Reports
1. The Reports
The legal origins thesis has had a lot of influence, but nowhere
more than through its adoption by the World Bank for its Doing Busi-
ness reports. As early as 2002, the World Bank took up the finding of
the Legal Origins thesis that the common law is more conducive to
economic growth.19 Beginning in 2004, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, has been is-
suing annual reports that measure and compare the “ease of doing
business” in more than 130 countries worldwide. The first report ad-
dressed five types of business activity; this list has been expanded to
ten activities since the 2007 report.20 Led by Simeon Djankov, a fre-
quent coauthor with LLS (and now Bulgarian finance minister and
deputy prime minister), the reports rely strongly (though not, of
course, exclusively) on the legal origins thesis and its literature.21 Al-
though the reports measure the attractiveness for investors rather
than  economic growth, their relevance for economic success is quite
obvious.22
The Doing Business reports have given the legal origins thesis a
distribution forum, access to funding for its expensive surveys, and
the reputation of the World Bank. Indeed, the reports have become
18. Id. at 286. As early as 1998, the authors used “legal traditions as cruder prox-
ies for the political orientation of governments.” La Porta et al., The Quality of
Government, 15 J. OF L., ECON. & ORG. 222, 232 (1999).
19. WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM: OBSERVATIONS, EXPERIENCES AND
APPROACH OF THE LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY 20 (2002), as quoted in Frank H. Stephen
& Stefan Van Hemmen, Laws, Enforcement, Legality, and Economic Development, 26
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 46-47 (2008).
20. Starting a business; dealing with licenses (later changed to “dealing with con-
struction permits”); hiring and firing workers (later changed to “employing workers”);
registering property; getting credit; protecting investors; paying taxes; trading across
borders; enforcing contracts; closing a business.
21. See DOING BUSINESS 2004—UNDERSTANDING REGULATIONS, xiv.
22. See, e.g., DOING BUSINESS 2004, id. at 83 (“Heavier regulation of business ac-
tivities generally brings bad outcomes, while clearly defined and well-protected
property rights enhance prosperity”). For criticism, see Amanda Perry-Kessaris,
Finding and Facing Facts about Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment in
South Asia, 23 LEG. STUD. 649 (2003).
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the most-circulated series issued by that institution. They are ac-
tively marketed: they have their own website and blog and even a
presence on Facebook; the annual reports for 2008 and 2009 were
virtually launched on Second Life. Yet, the Doing Business reports
display a number of crucial changes from the academic literature
that underlies them. First, whereas the findings of the legal origins
literature are confined to empirical research and descriptive and ana-
lytical statements, the Doing Business reports are aimed at decision
makers. One part of their intended audience are international inves-
tors. Yet their main goal is to spur reform in countries that are found
to be deficient. Indeed, the ten best reforming countries from one year
to the next are joined as the “reformers club” and feted by the World
Bank. A second important change is the decision, since the second
annual report in 2005, to rank the various countries based on how
they perform with regard both to individual activities and overall. In
these rankings, the legal origins thesis is confirmed: among the ten
top-ranked countries in the 2009 report are eight common law and
two Scandinavian nations. Traditional civil law countries perform
relatively badly: Switzerland as the strongest continental European
legal system is ranked at 21 (behind Malaysia); France is now ranked
at 31 (two ranks ahead of Azerbaijan it was ranked as low as 47th in
the 2005 report. Nonetheless, the IFC is eager to point out that civil
law countries can perform well on any of the indices.
2. Reactions and Developments
The Doing Business reports have had enormous impact. Govern-
ments reacted by emphasizing reform. For example, the Rwandan
President established, in 2007, a national Doing Business Unit with
the explicit goal of improving the country’s rankings—and indeed,
Rwanda is now the “top performer,” having moved from the 163rd to
the 67th rank in the 2010 report. Dubai established an International
Financial Centre governed by common law because that was per-
ceived as more attractive for investors.23 Whether private investors
also rely on the reports and especially on the rankings is less clear.
At the same time, the Doing Business reports have been contro-
versial from the beginning. Three types of criticism are particularly
relevant here. A first significant criticism comes from economists and
concerns the methodology, in particular of the ranking methodology.
Economists point out, amongst others,  that the minute differences
between the data for differently ranked countries do not allow mean-
ingful assessments on individual rankings, especially in view of the
great differences between countries and economies otherwise. Moreo-
23. Michael Strong & Robert Himber, The Legal Autonomy of the Dubai Interna-
tional Financial Centre: A Scalable Strategy for Global Free Market Reforms, 29
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS Issue 2, 36 (June 2009).
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ver, economists have argued that the method will induce countries to
improve their rankings rather than address the actual problems.24
A second criticism is substantive; it is directed against a per-
ceived preference for deregulation over other values—one being
solidarity and justice, the other being culture.25 Especially controver-
sial was use of an “employing workers indicator” (EWI) that
measures, in essence, how easy it is to hire and fire. Not surprisingly,
labor organizations, in particular the International Trade Union Con-
federation and the International Labor Organization, criticized what
they viewed as a one-sided focus on efficiency at the expense of inter-
ests in labor.26 Critics suggested that countries are actually rewarded
if they do not ratify pertinent ILO conventions. In 2008, even the IMF
ordered its staff not to use the EWI. The U.S. Congress has recently
asked the U.S. representative to the World Bank to work towards
suspension of the use of the “Employing Workers’ Indicator” in its
current form for the purpose of ranking or scoring country
performance.27
A third criticism, directed already at the legal origins thesis but
voiced with more emphasis against the Doing Business reports, is
specifically legal and concerns the insufficient understanding of law.
Within the World Bank, lawyers were highly critical of the noncha-
lant treatment of their discipline by economists, a criticism that
mirrors a widely held perception of the different roles of lawyers and
economists within the World Bank.28 Outside the World Bank,
French lawyers in particular were shocked by the low ranking that
France received in the survey and the poor understanding the report
showed, in their view, of French law. The Association of the Friends of
French Legal Culture published two reports—one co-authored by
French members of the association, one compiling reactions from for-
24. Bjørn Høyland et al, Be careful when Doing Business (2008), available at
http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/sites/ifiwatchnet.org/files/Doing%20Business_ESOPanal-
ysis.pdf; Benito Arrun˜ada, Pitfalls to Avoid when Measuring Institutions: Is Doing
Business Damaging Business?, J. COMP. ECON. 729 (2007). The Independent Evalua-
tion Group did not find evidence of such reactions. WORLD BANK INDEPENDENT
EVALUATION GROUP (IEG), infra note 34, at 19, 46, 65-66 (2008). R
25. For a survey of literature, see Sangheon Lee et al., The World Bank’s Employ-
ing Workers” Index: Findings and Critiques—A Review of Recent Evidence, 147 INT’L
LABOUR REV. 416 (2008). For an alternative proposal, see Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexi-
bility, Legal Reform and Economic Development, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2009).
26. ITUC welcomes World Bank’s suspension of “Doing Business” labour indica-
tor, available at http://www.ituc-csi.org/spip.php?article3505; ILO, World Bank Doing
Business report: The employing workers indicator (GB.300/4/1) (2007), available at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-relconf/documents/meeting
document/wcms_085125.pdf;.
27. H.R. Rep. No. 111-151, at 44-45 (2009) (Conf. Rep.).
28. Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Use of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Eco-
nomic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 253, 278-95 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); Galit Sarfaty,
Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human Rights
at the World Bank, AM. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming).
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eign members—severely criticizing the Doing Business report 2004.29
Numerous other French scholars and institutions joined in. A new
research institute was established to demonstrate the attractiveness
of French law.30 (Somewhat typically, almost all of these contribu-
tions were published in French,31 leaving them with almost no
impact in the international sphere.) There is less debate in Germany,
though a couple of German legal scholars have also presented critical
responses.32 Bar associations in the United Kingdom and in Ger-
many have also begun to market their laws more aggressively.33
Such criticism from both outside and within the World Bank has
led to an appraisal of the Doing Business project by the Independent
Evaluation Group, a unit within the World Bank Group.34 The re-
port, based on a literature review, analysis of ratings and underlying
data published by the Doing Business reports, and interviews with
World Bank and IFC staff as well as country officials and experts,
emphasizes some of the criticism voiced in the discussion before, es-
pecially regarding the use of the employing workers indicator35 and
the ranking method.36 (Still, the report also recognizes how effective
cross-country rankings are for spurring dialogue and for motivating
interest and action, and it proposes that the World Bank use such
rankings for other projects.) The report also questions the correlation
between ease of business and overall economic performance. The re-
port is more ambivalent about the legal origins thesis.37 On the one
29. ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT DES AMIS DE LAW CULTURE JURIDIQUE FRAN-
C¸AISE, LES DROITS DE TRADITION CIVILISTE EN QUESTION. A PROPOS DES RAPPORTS DOING
BUSINESS (2 Vols, 2006); see Be´ne´dicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Anne-Julie Kerhuel, Is
Law an Economic Contest ? French Reactions to the Doing Business World Bank Re-
ports and Economic Analysis of the Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 811, 820-24 (2009).
30. Http://www.gip-recherche-justice.fr/aed.htm.
31. An exception is Me´nard & du Marais, infra note 45; published in an earlier R
version in NEW FRONTIERS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. FIRST INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC
CONFERENCE ON LAW AND ECONOMICS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. GALLEN 7 (2006).
32. Very critically CHRISTOPH KERN, JUSTICE BETWEEN SIMPLIFICATION AND FOR-
MALISM (2007); Christoph Kern, Die Doing-Business-Reports der Weltbank –
fragwu¨rdige Quantifizierung rechtlicher Qualita¨t?, 64 JURISTENZEITUNG 498 (2009);
somewhat more positive is Mathias M. Siems, What Does not Work in Comparing
Securities Laws, A Critique on La Porta et al.’s Methodology, INT’L COMP. & COM. L.
REV. 300 (2005); Mathias M. Siems, Numerical Comparative Law—Do we Need Sta-
tistical Evidence in Law in Order to Reduce Complexity?, 13 CARD. J. INT. COMP. L.
521 (2006); Siems, supra note 5. R
33. See ENGLAND AND WALES: THE JURISDICTION OF CHOICE (2008), available at
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/documents/downloads/jurisdiction_of_choice_brochure.
pdf; LAW—MADE IN GERMANY (2008), available at http://www.lawmadeingermany.de/
Law-Made_in_Germany.pdf; see also Otfried Ho¨ffe, Die Alte Welt im Recht, FRANK-
FURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 18 May 2009, 71; Horst Eidenmu¨ller, Recht als
Produkt, 64 JURISTENZEITUNG 641 (2009).
34. WORLD BANK INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP (IEG), DOING BUSINESS: AN
INDEPENDENT EVALUATION. TAKING THE MEASURE OF THE WORLD BANK-IFC DOING
BUSINESS INDICATORS (2008).
35. Id. at 33-34, 52.
36. Id. at 18-19, 52, 61-66.
37. Id. at 24-26, 69-75.
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hand, it accepts both the causal role of legal origins for many indica-
tors and the findings that civil law systems perform worse. On the
other hand, the report emphasizes that “civil law countries can still
score well on the [Doing Business] indicators” and even points out,
somewhat bizarrely, that “[i]f a hypothetical civil law economy were
constructed combining the scores of the highest-scoring civil law
country on each indicator, it would place third in the overall rank-
ing.”38 Given the enormous differences between the highest-ranking
civil law countries, it is hard to conceive of such a hypothetical
economy.
In response to the independent evaluation, the Doing Business
Group at first altered its method only slightly.39 A more dramatic
step followed earlier this year when the Group announced that it
would henceforth reward countries for complying with relevant ILO
Conventions under the assumption “that well-designed worker pro-
tections are of benefit to the society as a whole” and that it would
remove the Employing Workers Indicator (EWI) as incompatible with
World Bank policy, and possibly replace it with a worker protection
indicator that could cover matters such as the extent to which a coun-
try is adhering to core international labor standards.40 This change,
explained at greater length in the Doing Business 2010 report,41 rep-
resents a significant shift in focus away from efficiency towards a
broader vision of the project. It can be presumed that the change was
a reaction to external pressure rather than a result of internal
processes.42
III. SOME COMPARATIVE LAW THEMES
What should we comparative lawyers make of all this? The au-
thors of both the legal origins thesis and the Doing Business reports
are all economists (and “lawyer wannabes,” as one of them put it)43
who aim their project at comparative economics, not comparative
38. WORLD BANK INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, supra note 34, at 26. R
39. Http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/MethodologyNote.aspx,
criticized as insufficient by Benito Arrun˜ada How Doing Business Jeopardizes Institu-
tional Reform (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1143312. For earlier
changes to the method, see http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/
MethodologyNoteArchive.aspx.
40. Revisions to the EWI Indicator, available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/
documents/EWI_revisions.pdf.
41. See now DOING BUSINESS 2010—REFORMING THROUGH DIFFICULT TIMES.
42. For an analysis still very much in tune with deregulation, see Simeon
Djankov & Rita Ramalho, Employment Laws in Developing Countries, 37 J. COMP.
ECON. 3 (2009). Cf. Joshua C. Hall & Peter T. Leeson, Good for the Goose, Bad for the
Gander: International Labor Standards and Comparative Development, 28 J. LABOR
RESEARCH 658 (2007).
43. Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, as quoted in Nicholas Thompson, Common De-
nominator, LEGAL AFFAIRS Jan./Feb. 2005, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/
issues/January-February-2005/feature_thompson_janfeb05.msp.
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law. Nonetheless, there are a number of noteworthy connections with
comparative law projects.
A. Comparative Law Method
The economic and statistical approach endorsed by the legal ori-
gins literature and the Doing Business  reports has, at first sight,
little in common with traditional comparative law. Yet, a second look
reveals interesting parallels with the emphasis in comparative law
on law in action and with two core methods of our discipline: the func-
tional method and the common core approach.
1. Law in the Books and Law in Action
Early texts in the legal origins literature focused merely on legal
rules, with little attention paid to how they are applied in practice.44
This focus on formal law was clearly deficient from a comparative law
perspective, which has long emphasized the importance of law in ac-
tion over law in the books and on how law is applied in fact as
opposed to merely what its rules say.45 The focus on formal law was
especially puzzling in economics given its focus on real world develop-
ment; it can only be explained by the deficient understanding of law
that prevails in so many neighbor disciplines. Indeed, the focus in the
legal origins literature has been broadened: interviews are now di-
rected at how legal rules play out in fact, and the understanding of
law includes its enforcement. However, as we have known in compar-
ative law, this adds significant complexity to the analysis, both in its
descriptive and in its normative variants. Changing legal rules is
easy, but it is also mostly ineffective, as the earlier law and develop-
ment experience has shown. The actual application of law and
people’s attitudes towards that law are much harder to change; they
are also—this is important for the legal origins literature—harder to
measure. Thus, when LLS now proclaim that “transplantation in-
volves not just specific legal rules . . . but also legal institutions . . .
human capital of the participants in the legal system, and crucially
the strategy of the law for dealing with new problems,”46 they paint a
44. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 6, at 1140, focus on enforcement R
because “a strong system of legal enforcement could substitute for weak rules, since
active and well-functioning courts can step in and rescue investors abused by the
management.” However, in that study, they only look generally at the strength of the
rule of law and similar macrocomparative aspects, not at the specific enforcement of
the particular legal rules under review.
45. Claude Me´nard & Bertrand du Marais, Can we Rank Legal Systems Accord-
ing to their Economic Efficiency?, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 72-75 (2008); see
generally Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Sec-
ond Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J.COMP.L. 671, at 675-76, 679-80 (2002).
See already David Campbell & Sol Piciotto, Exploring the Interaction between Law
and Economics: The Limits of Formalism, 18 LEG. STUD. 249, 262-66 (1998).
46. La Porta et al., supra note 17, at 307. R
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somewhat unrealistic picture of legal transplants. The problem is
that, more often than not, transplantation does not involve human
capital.47 Moreover, the authors’ conviction that “beliefs and ideolo-
gies become incorporated in legal rules, institutions, and education
and, as such, are transmitted from one generation to the next” dis-
plays, in the end, an undue faith in the power of formal rules.
Twentieth-century Germany, to use but one example, has seen five
political regimes with radically different ideologies, while core legal
rules, institutions, and education remained remarkably similar.48 If
we have learned anything in comparative law, it is that legal rules
alone are compatible with a wide variety of ideologies, and that law
reform must go much farther than just the adoption of rules.
2. Functional Method
At its core, the economic method used by the legal origins litera-
ture and the Doing Business reports is really a quantitative
refinement of the functional method.49 The proximity between func-
tionalist comparative law and economics has been recognized before:
economic efficiency can serve as a benchmark against which legal
systems are measured.50 This is the case when Henry Hansmann and
Ugo Mattei analyze the trust under U.S. law and compare it to solu-
tions under European civil law;51 when Hein Ko¨tz uses economic
arguments of the cheapest risk avoider and the cheapest risk insurer
to compare English and German law on unfair terms in consumer
contracts;52 or when Aristides Hatzis shows for various areas of con-
tract law how “the solution provided by the civil law systems . . . is
more congenial to the one advocated by economists as the most effi-
cient one.”53 In this literature, however, economic efficiency is
established in the abstract and usually provides no more than a
starting point for debate. The legal origins literature by contrast,
promises not only empirical data but also embraces a broader scope of
47. Cf. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM: WHAT COR-
PORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND
THE WORLD 210-12 (2008).
48. See DAS BGB IM WANDEL DER EPOCHEN (Uwe Diederichsen & Wolfgang Sel-
lert eds., 2002); Joachim Ru¨ckert, Das BGB und seine Prinzipien: Aufgabe, Lo¨sung
und Erfolg, in I HISTORISCH-KRITISCHER KOMMENTAR ZUM BGB 34 (2003).
49. Michaels, supra note 7, at 354 with references.
50. See Ralf Michaels, The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics?, 59
U. TORONTO L. J. 197, 199 (2009) with references.
51. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434 (1998).
52. Hein Ko¨tz, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts. Recent Developments in Eu-
rope from a Comparative and Economic Perspective, in FESTSKRIFT TIL OLE LANDO 203
(Lynge Andersen ed., 1997). The basis for the least-cost risk avoider and least-cost
risk insurer considerations is GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
53. Aristides N. Hatzis, Civil Contract Law and Economic Reasoning—An Un-
likely Pair?, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPEAN CODES AND CONTRACT LAW 159, 175
(Stefan Grundmann & Martin Schauer eds., 2006).
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functions of law. Laws are compared with regard to multiple immedi-
ate functions and one overall function. The immediate functions all
concern the facilitation of individual economic conduct: establishing a
corporation, evicting a delinquent tenant, firing employees. The over-
all function is to provide economic growth.
One frequent criticism of functionalist comparative law can be
directed against the legal origins literature as well: the assumption
that legal institutions necessarily perform certain functions and that
certain functions make certain laws necessary.54 The function of
courts is to enforce contracts; the enforcement of contracts requires
effective courts. Other functions of legal rules are ignored: warning
functions of formal requirements, social protection in tenancy and
employment laws, etc. Functional equivalents—other institutions, le-
gal or non-legal, that perform the same function—are ignored as
well.55 Perhaps the function of minority shareholder protection,
which is performed by unblocked shares in the common law, is per-
formed by other means in Germany.56 Perhaps the role of courts in
developing the law is performed by legislators in France and scholars
in Germany, so that the difference in the respective ability of legal
systems to evolve is smaller than assumed by the legal origins schol-
ars.57 Perhaps the formalities in French law on the transfer of
property in land must be compared with title insurance and searches,
which add considerable burdens on such transfers in the United
States that the Doing Business reports ignore.
These problems can, perhaps, be remedied if studies take more
seriously the possibility of functional equivalents.58 However, limits
to the method remain. Functionalist comparative law has been criti-
cized for its reductionism and its inability to provide thick
descriptions of legal systems.59 I do not think that the functional
method, understood (as it should) as a hermeneutical approach to le-
gal systems, is necessarily more reductionist than other methods.60
But I do agree that empirical comparative law must ultimately be
confined to what can be measured, which means that it cannot cap-
ture the full richness of legal systems. Coding as the method of the
legal origins literature is necessarily reductionist; its isolation of sin-
54. See, most recently, RICHARD HYLAND, GIFTS—A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW
69-73 (2009).
55. Mathias Siems & Simon Deakin, Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present
and Future Research 5, 7 (2009), available at ssrn.com/abstract=1428247.
56. MARKUS BERNDT, GLOBAL DIFFERENCES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS
(2002), cited after Siems & Deakin, id, at 6.
57. Michaels, supra note 50, at 205-07, drawing on R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, R
LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS: CHAPTERS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY (1987).
58. Armour et al., supra note 16. R
59. Locus classicus is Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Compar-
ative Perspective, in CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 167 (1983).
60. Michaels, supra note 7, at 364-65.
\\server05\productn\C\COM\57-4\COM410.txt unknown Seq: 15  5-OCT-09 11:08
2009] COMPARATIVE LAW BY NUMBERS? 779
gle elements represents the polar opposite of thick description. This
is not a reason to dismiss coding altogether, in particular insofar as it
contributes valuable empirical and experimental knowledge to a
functional method in comparative law that is often purely specula-
tive. But it suggests that other approaches will be required as well.
3. Case Method
The legal origins literature overlaps not only with functionalist
comparative law but also with the case method of common core re-
search. Consider that Djankov et al., in order to measure debt
enforcement in various countries, “present insolvency practitioners in
each country with the same case study of an insolvent firm” and “then
ask each practitioner to describe in detail how debt enforcement for
these case facts in his or her country will proceed, step by step.”61 This
method of presenting the same case pattern to different legal systems
has a parallel in traditional comparative law, where it provides the
foundation of studies of the common core of legal systems—first
Schlesinger’s early project on contract formation,62 more recently
studies on a common core of European private law.63 Parallels
abound: both economists and common core researchers rely on the
input from legal experts from the respective countries; both use ques-
tionnaires that are, where necessary, revised in view of the first
responses from these experts. Indeed, Ugo Mattei has explicitly sug-
gested economic analysis as a helpful tool for common core
research.64
And yet, in the end the differences are more important than the
similarities. Methodologically, the common core projects are explic-
itly legal in nature: Schlesinger was interested in how contracts were
formed; the European project is interested in how cases are solved
and what legal formants are involved in these solutions. This is not
the goal of the legal origins literature, which views legal rules as
mere factors in the research of extralegal developments, most impor-
tantly the ability to do business and the economic progress of
national economies. Whereas the common core research aims at
presenting legal systems in all their complexity and internal incoher-
ence among various legal formants, the legal origins literature
reduces legal systems to very few factors.
It must be conceded that in terms of influence the common core
projects have been far less successful than the legal origins litera-
61. Simeon Djankov et al., Debt Enforcement Around the World, 116 J. POL. ECON.
1105, 1106 (2008). The focus on cases characterizes also the “autopsies” method used
by MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 47, at 8-11, 45-46. R
62. FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
(Rudolf B. Schlesinger ed., 1968).
63. Http://www.common-core.org.
64. UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 95-99 (1997).
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ture. Schlesinger’s common core did not attract further funding,
perhaps because its costs seemed disproportionate to its findings.65
The Common Core of European Private Law project has had remark-
ably little influence on European private law, compared to other
projects with far less effort and depth. In the end, the detailed
description of commonalities and differences in comparative law, cou-
pled with the explicit rejection of any evaluation, has not been a great
success story. Perhaps David Kennedy is right when he speculates
that “[p]ost-war comparatists seemed determined to establish a pro-
fessional practice more earnest and boring than many of them could
actually stand to pursue.”66 Legal origins and Doing Business reports
are more successful in part because of their strong normative ele-
ment. But they also showcase another advantage from which
comparative lawyers may learn: the ability to present the very de-
tailed and rich findings in a very accessible, statistical form.67 This
need not mean that comparative lawyers must adopt statistics. But it
suggests that one quality of comparative law, namely its emphasis on
description and detail, can quickly turn into a shortcoming as regards
effectiveness.
B. Legal Families and the Civil/Common Law Divide
A core element of the legal origins thesis is the distinction be-
tween the civil and common law families. This distinction plays
multiple roles. First, membership in a legal family is viewed as an
explanatory factor, as a cause for past and present economic develop-
ment. Second, legal families are evaluated on the basis of their
economic performance: the common law comes out, by and large, as
superior. Third, legal families are used as models for law reform. All
of this makes it worthwhile to relate LLS’ use of legal families to com-
parative law knowledge.
1. The Division of Legal Families
LLS allocate legal systems to either the civil or the common law
family. Critics have pointed out that the way in which LLS assign
legal systems to one or the other legal family is crude and often
faulty.68 In addition, “all legal systems are mixed.”69 Even if defined
65. Ulrich Drobnig, Memorial Address for Rudolf Schlesinger: Delivered at the
University of Trento Law School, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 765, 769 (1998).
66. David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUD-
IES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 345, 351-52 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday
eds., 2003).
67. See Spamann, supra note 11, at 804-06. R
68. E.g., Mathias Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Compar-
ative Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 55, 65-70 (2007). Indeed, the CIA World Factbook that
LLSV used can hardly be called a typical comparative law source.
69. Esin O¨ru¨cu¨, A General View of ‘Legal Families’ and of ‘Mixing Systems,’ in
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 169, 177 (Esin O¨ru¨cu¨ & David Nelken eds., 2007).
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in the narrow sense as systems with both common and civil law influ-
ences, mixed systems are the norm rather than the exception.
Influences from continental legal thought on English common law
and on U.S. law have been researched extensively; the counterin-
fluence from common law on civil law is a little less well-researched
but certainly exists.70 Moreover, especially in non-Western countries,
Western law has often mixed with domestic legal traditions, resulting
in mutual influence.71
In essence, LLS are not interested in all legal families but only
two: common law and civil law (and within the latter usually just
French-law based systems). Although the civil/common law divide
has been borrowed from comparative law and represents, for some,
still the core of our field, its use is quite problematic. In comparative
law, we have come to think that the civil law/common law distinction
is no longer very relevant for most important questions72 and espe-
cially less important than that between the law of developed and that
of developing nations: the laws of developed capitalists economies are
converging to a large degree, while the laws in many developing
countries are still deficient. France  may be a close neighbor of Azer-
baijan in the rankings; but their economies (and their laws) are like
apples and oranges in almost every way. The difference between civil
and common law seems especially irrelevant, as critics have pointed
out, for most of the areas of economic law researched by the legal
origins literature.73 Yet, the civil/common law divide does remain rel-
evant for civil procedure, which is still different among these legal
families.74 And the two explanations for the impact of legal origins on
economic development75—greater independence of common law
judges and greater adaptability of the common law—are both
grounded in differences of procedure. This makes it important for
comparative lawyers to address the plausibility of these two theses in
70. An extensive literature looks at the influence of U.S. law, though rarely with
an emphasis on its role as a common law system. For a brief survey with references,
see Ralf Michaels, American Law (United States), in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COM-
PARATIVE LAW 66, 73-74 (Jan Smits ed., 2006).
71. A telling example is Donald Horowitz, The Qur’an and the Common Law: Is-
lamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change (pts. 1 & 2), 42 AM. J. COMP. L.
233, 543 (1994).
72. Reinhard Zimmermann, Der europa¨ische Charakter des englischen Rechts:
Historische Verbindungen zwischen civil law und common law, 1 ZEUP 4 (1993);
James Gordley, Common law und civil law: eine u¨berholte Unterscheidung, 1 ZEUP
498 (1993). But see Pierre Legrand, The Same and the Different, in COMPARATIVE LE-
GAL STUDIES, supra note 66, at 240. R
73. Detlev Vagts, Comparative Company Law—The New Wave, in FESTSCHRIFT
FU¨R JEAN NICOLAS DRUEY ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 595, 599 (2003).
74. See only OSCAR G. CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
(2007).
75. Supra, at 769.
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particular. Lawyer-economists have taken this on;76 comparative
lawyers should make sure that our (considerable) expertise in this
area is used to refine or refute the assumptions in the economics
literature.77
2. The Use of Legal Families
The more important criticism concerns not how legal systems are
allocated to legal families but how the idea of legal families is used
more generally. Comparative lawyers see their value now as mainly
didactic,78 fluid,79 and context-dependent.80 Hein Ko¨tz has persua-
sively argued that legal families help beginners, but the interesting
questions are elsewhere.81 By contrast, LLS take legal families as
hard data. Thus, they invoke Zweigert & Ko¨tz’s idea that legal sys-
tems can be distinguished by their ideology, although Zweigert and
Ko¨tz explicitly reject this criterion for the distinction between civil
and common law.82 LLS adopt Damaska’s distinction between civil
law as “policy implementing,” and common law as “dispute resolv-
ing,”83 even though Damaska uses these descriptions merely as
Weberian ideal types and has warned explicitly that “characteristics
of the two archetypes should not be understood as repositories of es-
sential facets of existing procedures in civil- and common-law
countries.”84
In the view expressed in the legal origins literature, legal fami-
lies are also constant over time. After the original claim that
differences between common law and civil law were developed in the
twelfth century proved to be untenable, the authors of the legal ori-
76. Gillian Hadfield, The Levers of Legal Design, 36 J. COMP. ECON. 43 (2008);
Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Explaining de facto Judicial Independence, 27 INT’L REV.
LAW & ECON. 269 (2007); Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, The Relevance of Judicial Pro-
cedure for Economic Growth, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 269 (2007).
77. This year’s conference of the International Association of Procedural Law in
Toronto was dedicated to the topic.
78. Similarly Siems, supra note 68, at 69. See Zweigert & Ko¨tz, supra note 7, at R
73; RENE´ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY
21 (1985).
79. Zweigert & Ko¨tz, supra note 7, at 66-67; Jaako Husa, Classification of Legal R
Families Today. Is it Time for a Memorial Hymn?, 2004 REV. INT. DR. COMP. 11, 14-16
(2004).
80. ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 7, at 65-66. R
81. Hein Ko¨tz, Abschied von der Rechtskreislehre?, 6 ZEuP 495 (1998); Hein Ko¨tz,
Rechtskreislehre, in II HANDWO¨RTERBUCH ZUM EUROPA¨ISCHEN PRIVATRECHT 1247, 1248
(Ju¨rgen Basedow, Klaus Hopt, Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2009), English transla-
tion forthcoming.
82. Compare La Porta et al., supra note 17, at 286-87, with ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, R
supra note 7, at 72. R
83. La Porta et al., supra note 17, at 286. R
84. MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 12 (1986).
Similarly for legal families as Weberian ideal types Jaako Husa, Legal Families and
Research in Comparative Law, GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES Vol. 1 Issue 3 Art. 4 (2001),
available at http://works.bepress.com/jaakko_husa/1.
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gins thesis now situate the divergence in the seventeenth through
nineteenth centuries.85 Ultimately, the point in time is irrelevant to
their claim that after the divergence occurred, the styles became con-
stant. That claim is unpersuasive. It is unclear why legal systems can
change dramatically at one point in time and then remain impervious
to further change. It is also unclear how both the colonial imposition
explanation and the policy recommendations in the Doing Business
reports are compatible with the idea of an unchanging legal tradition.
But most importantly, the idea of an unchanging legal character ap-
pears incompatible with comparative law knowledge. Most
comparative lawyers oppose the idea that a country’s legal system is
static, which is why we now prefer the dynamic notion of “legal tradi-
tion” over that of “legal family.”86 There is certainly some type of
continuity that may be expressed in economic terms as path depen-
dency which means that different legal systems will respond
differently to common developments. But this is quite different from
claiming perpetual characteristics.
In emphasizing an ultimately inalterable difference between civil
and common law as the most important distinction, the legal origins
literature ironically parallels the views of one of the most outspoken
critics of comparative law and economics, Pierre Legrand.87 Both
may well be correct that we comparative lawyers have overestimated
the convergence between civil and common law as well as the adapta-
bility of both legal systems. The legal origins literature would then
provide helpful empirical data that may suggest a persistent distinc-
tion between the political economies of civil and common law
countries with strong historical roots.88 This would only be proven,
however, if the measurements and evaluations were performed accu-
rately, and that is doubtful, as discussed in the next subsection.
C. Commensurability and Evaluation
A major reason for the great success of both the legal origins the-
sis and the Doing Business reports lies in their strong normative
comparative conclusion: common law as better for economic progress
than civil law. In the legal origins thesis, the conclusion is still
presented as descriptive and also modified (though only slightly); the
Doing Business reports by contrast are quite openly evaluative. Al-
85. La Porta et al,. supra note 17, at 303-06. R
86. Reimann, supra note 45 at 677-78 (2002); H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Le- R
gal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 421, 437-39. R
87. Pierre Legrand, Econocentrism, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 215 (2009). Legrand was
not always so opposed to comparative law and economics; see Pierre Legrand, Jr., Pre-
Contractual Disclosure and Information: English and French Law Compared, 6 OX. J.
LEG. STUD. 322, 343-5 (1986).
88. Thus John Reitz, Legal Origins, Political Economy, and the Problem of Gener-
alization, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 847 (2009).
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though comparative lawyers endorse such evaluative comparison
when they discuss regulatory competition (an idea borrowed from
economists), by and large, they despise comparative evaluation is in-
compatible with their main goal of pure knowledge.89 Essentially,
there are two reasons for this unease with evaluation: the problem of
commensurability and the risk of homeward bias.
1. Regulatory Competition
  One way in which economics has long been used in traditional com-
parative law is in the discussion of regulatory competition. Jan Smits
has argued for such competition as a bottom-up approach towards
private law unification in Europe;90 Anthony Ogus views such compe-
tition as a useful generator of information for law reform.91 However,
the use of economics in this context is quite a bit looser than in its
original formulation. In many studies, regulatory competition is more
a rhetorical figure than an actual economic model,92 a starting point
for more conventional comparative law analysis. More often than not,
competition of legal systems is used as a mere toolbox for legislators;
the idea that legal systems themselves truly compete is not shared by
many comparatists. The Doing Business reports, by contrast, empha-
size precisely such competition, especially competition for private
investors. At the same time, they show some of the problems of such
competition. First, in making explicit policy recommendations, the
Doing Business reports interfere in the “market for laws”93 that they
set out to measure. Second, the emphasis on ease of doing business at
the expense of other policy considerations, for example, employee pro-
tection, presents the well-known risk of a “race to the bottom;” as
reactions at the World Bank show, this risk is being recognized.94
The recent adoption of other values beyond efficiency95 presents an
unintentional approximation to comparative law’s emphasis on more
holistic comparison.
89. See discussion and references in H. Patrick Glenn, Aims of Comparative Law,
in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 70, at 57, 58-89. R
90. Jan Smits, European Private Law: A Plea for a Spontaneous Legal Order, in
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND LAW 55 (D.M. Curtin et al. eds., 2006).
91. Ogus, infra note 138. R
92. See EVA-MARIA KIENINGER, WETTBEWERB DER PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNGEN IM
EUROPA¨ISCHEN BINNENMARKT (2002).
93. ERIN O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009); cf. MILHAUPT &
PISTOR, supra note 47, at 213 (“commodification of law”); Eidenmu¨ller, supra note 33. R
94. See supra 774-75.
95. Supra, 775.
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2. Relativity
Commensurability is a key prerequisite for comparability and
therefore a key issue in comparative law.96 Comparison requires a
tertium comparationis: we always compare legal systems with regard
to a specific factor, be it the performance of a certain function or
something else. It follows that findings of similarity and difference
are always relative to the specific tertium that was chosen. Absolute
comparison is impossible. This is even more true for determining the
better law: a law can be better than another only with regard to the
specific function they both perform. Comparative lawyers have be-
come cautious in evaluating one law as better than another. Some
object to any evaluative comparison on the basis of incommensurabil-
ity. Yet, even those who see value in it are hesitant, and for a reason:
if both laws are functionally equivalent they are by definition of equal
value with regard to that specific function. “The specific function it-
self cannot serve as a yardstick, for functionally equivalent
institutions are by definition of equal value with respect to that func-
tion—equivalence means, literally, of equal value.”97 Differences may
occur only outside of that function: their ability to perform other func-
tions, their costs, etc.98
The legal origins literature accepts this restriction, as do the Do-
ing Business reports. However, in the presentation, the relative
character of the comparison drops out of sight. This may be the big-
gest problem with the ranking of countries in the Doing Business
reports: they suggest a ranking with regard to the absolute quality of
legal systems, and they thereby put pressure on countries to focus
their domestic policies on the factors that the Doing Business report
measures—and to neglect other functions of the law.99 It appears as
though the common law is better than the civil law tout court, instead
of only in promoting economic growth.100
Of course, this reductionist quality of rankings is an advantage
for their marketability. Rankings are simpler than complex compari-
sons. It is precisely this simplicity that makes them suspicious from a
comparative law perspective. At the same time, we comparative law-
yers may need to ask ourselves whether we have not gone too far in
96. See Nils Jansen, Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 305. R
97. Michaels, supra note 7, at 374.
98. See Michaels, supra note 7, at 374-76.
99. See Bjørn Høyland et al., The Tyranny of International Index Rankings (2009),
available at http://folk.uio.no/bjornkho/TyrannyIndexRankingsHoylandMoeneWillum
sen.pdf. In the United States, a similar problem is known from the ranking of law
schools, which appears to measure the objective quality of law schools and therefore
creates strong incentives for law schools to improve rankings, not law schools. See
only Michael E. Solimine, Status Seeking and the Allure and Limits of Law School
Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 299 (2006).
100. Cf. Jansen, supra note 96, at 312-14. R
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our refusal to evaluate and in our emphasis on incommensurability.
Some of the most influential studies in comparative law—Langbein’s
study of German civil procedure, Damaska’s analysis on court struc-
tures, James Whitman’s  studies on dignity—all present theses that
are, on their face, much too crude and simple and have since been
refined by subsequent writing. Yet their very simplicity was what got
the respective discussions going; it is therefore their strength, not
their weakness, and perhaps a strength that comparative law needs
in order to keep up with economics.
3. Objectivity
An additional problem in the comparative evaluation of legal sys-
tems is homeward bias. Every comparative lawyer knows the risk
that she may unknowingly favor her own law simply because she
knows it better; opinions differ merely over whether this homeward
bias can be overcome or whether we are necessarily stuck within the
mentality of our own legal system. Such homeward bias can come in
two variants. The first, perhaps more obvious variant, can be called
solution bias: the prioritization of our own system’s solutions over
those of other countries simply because we know them better and
have internalized them. This is the core bias of domestic lawyers that
comparative lawyers try to overcome. The legal origins literature and
the Doing Business reports promise to overcome these problems and
to provide true neutrality, though they are only partially successful.
They do provide a very helpful remedy against solution bias: the use
of empirical data and measurements.101 Traditional comparative
lawyers have a lot to learn here.
However, homeward bias can also come in a more subtle variant
that we may call question bias. It concerns not the solutions we find
but the questions we ask. Because we think within the framework of
our own legal system, we tend to ask questions posed by our own sys-
tem—and in many cases find that our own legal system provides the
better answers, simply because our legal system responds precisely to
these questions. The only way to overcome this bias is dialogue with
comparatists from other legal systems who may be able to point out
that questions that work in one framework make little sense in an-
other.  The legal origins literature is less successful in overcoming
question bias. Authors may point out that they are not lawyers, so
they cannot (one would hope) be biased in favor of one legal system’s
inherent rationality over the other. The questions they ask are eco-
nomic, not legal, in nature. Yet, rather than overcoming the problem,
that exacerbates it. First, it leads to a bias not for one legal system
over another but for one discipline over another, something that may
101. I ignore here critique of how accurate the data is; see WORLD BANK INDEPEN-
DENT EVALUATION, supra note 34, at 13-17. R
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be called economics bias.102 Moreover, because the economics used in
these projects is primarily U.S.-American in origin and has been de-
veloped with U.S. law in mind, the bias for economics turns quite
easily into a bias for U.S. law. The emphasis on shareholder rights, to
name but one example, reflect exactly one such bias. In other words,
the good performance of the U.S. and other common law systems is a
direct consequence of the questions asked.
D. Legal Transplants
Legal transplants—the transfer of legal norms and institutions
from one legal system to another—have two roles to play in the legal
origins literature. The first is descriptive and explanatory: the impo-
sition of Western laws on nonwestern countries in the course of
colonization is viewed as an explanatory factor for economic progress
in these colonies. The second role is normative: the export of common
law norms and institutions is recommended as a way to improve eco-
nomic performance. Both link up with traditional comparative law.
1. Colonization
Although the export of European legal systems in the nineteenth
century is a well-known topic in traditional comparative law, the po-
litical aspects of colonialism are often downplayed.103 Ironically, the
violence of colonization becomes a virtue for the legal origins litera-
ture: the assumption that laws were imposed on the colonies without
indigenous choice makes it possible to treat law as an exogenous fac-
tor. Unfortunately, the image of transplantation of laws is seriously
deficient from a comparative law standpoint. Transplantation was
more complex in colonization and post-colonization than presented by
LLS104 and it is more complex now. We know that the transplanta-
tion of laws does not leave these laws unchanged: transplanted laws
function more like legal irritants, creating internal developments
within the importing legal systems. (Only Alan Watson agrees that
laws remain unchanged in the process of transplantation, but he
would violently dispute the core assumption of the legal origins liter-
ature that such laws have a significant  impact on society and the
102. This is the core of the French critique against the Doing Business reports. See
Fauvarque-Cosson & Kerhuel, supra note 29.
103. Upendra Baxi, The Colonialist Heritage, in LEGRAND & MUNDAY, supra note
66, at 59. R
104. For English law, see B. H. MCPHERSON, THE RECEPTION OF ENGLISH LAW
ABROAD (2007); for French Law, see L’INFLUENCE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT FRANC¸AIS,
RAPPORT DU CONSEIL D’ETAT (Oliver Dutheillet de Lamothe & Marie-Aime´
Latournerie eds., 2001), available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rap
ports-publics/014000702/index.shtml.
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economy.)105 We know (as LLS now concede) that the transplantion
of formal laws cannot succeed unless it comes with the transport of
legal expertise. We know that legal export is not successful without
what Katharina Pistor and others have called, in explicit response to
the legal origins literature, the demand for law106 and what Otto
Kahn-Freund identified long ago as the relevance of local interest
groups that are pushing for its adoption.107
Despite all this, the legal origins thesis remains highly interest-
ing for comparative law. Traditionally, we might have thought that
the civil law should travel more easily than the common law, because
its reliance on systematized codification requires less expertise in the
recipient country; the situations in England with its traditionally ho-
mogenous culture and the United States with its peculiar role for the
law as a motor of social change are not easy to replicate. If LLS are
correct that common law colonies developed better economically than
civil law colonies, this raises the very important question whether the
relevant difference lies in legal systems or in some other factor. One
plausible explaining factor could be the British practice of indirect
rule that empowered local elites and thereby enabled the colonies,
especially after independence, to rely on local structures and institu-
tions and indigenous expertise, an important advantage over French
colonies that had to build such expertise from scratch.108
2. Law Reform
The legal origins thesis gets its bite not from using colonization
as an explanatory factor but from the normative implications made
explicit in the Doing Business reports: countries will perform better
today if they adopt common law structures than if they adopt civil
law structures. The Reports share this interest in improving law with
traditional comparative law, though with a twist: traditional compar-
ative lawyers have long focused mainly on the improvement of their
own law;109 the Doing Business reports, like the World Bank gener-
ally, aims primarily at improving the law elsewhere. In other words,
105. See ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE (2d ed. 2001). See also, now,
Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants – Legal Families and the Diffu-
sion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 (6) BYU L. REV. (forthcoming, Dec. 2009).
106. David Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163 (2003);
MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 47, at 201-12. R
107. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.
REV. 1, 12-13 (1974).
108. Cf. Sandra Fullerton Joireman, Inherited Legal Systems and Effective Rule of
Law: Africa and the Colonial Legacy, 39 J. OF MOD. AFR. STUD. 571, 579-81 (2001).
However, for evidence that indirect rule colonies had higher rates of instability, see
Matthew K. Lange, British Colonial Legacies and Political Development, 32 WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 905 (2004).
109. E.g. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 78, at 6-8; LE´ONTIN-JEAN CONSTAN- R
TINESCO, RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG I—EINFU¨HRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 371-73
(1971); ZWEIGERT & KO¨TZ, supra note 7, at 16-20. R
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what is at stake here is not so much the import of law but rather the
exportation of Western laws (primarily those from common law coun-
tries) to nonwestern countries. This may be one explanation for the
“one size fits all” approach in the early Doing Business reports: the
thought that what matters in law reform can be determined by find-
ing the best law and then exporting it, rather than focusing on local
conditions and the best “fit” as comparative lawyers would argue.
This does not make the studies meaningless. The focus on the
best fit is not confined to import; it is relevant to the export of law as
well. The importing country may not even always be better equipped
to determine the best fit than an outside observer; outside observes
can sometimes provide a fresh and helpful perspective on what might
make sense as reform. This means, however, that traditional compar-
ative lawyers may want to make their voices heard more prominently
in law reform projects. They can bring their special expertise in “best
fit” to the table. The Japanese approach to legal assistance, which
emphasizes such local requirements of “fit” and local demands, pro-
vides an interesting example of such an approach.110 The World
Bank and the IMF may prove to be open to such approaches more
based in comparative law as well.111
E. Culture
The main criticism voiced especially by French lawyers against
the Doing Business reports is their neglect of culture.112 This criti-
cism is representative of the recent cultural turn in comparative
law,113 a trend in turn favored by the unclear concept we comparative
lawyers have of culture.114 In France, one author has gone so far as to
dismiss law and economics as an idiotic science.115 In reality, the con-
flict of culture and economics is less clear-cut.
First, different research questions make different aspects rele-
vant or irrelevant. The legal origins literature is interested in the
connection between law and economic progress, not in the connection
between law and values or law and culture. It is not clear why re-
search into the relation between law and economic progress, which is
certainly not irrelevant, must necessarily include culture. Arguably,
110. Shuya Hayashi, The Search of Knowledge. Some Perspectives in Legal Assis-
tance in Developing Economies (unpublished paper, 2009).
111. See Milhaupt, supra note 4, last paragraph.
112. See Fauvarque-Cosson & Kerhuel, supra note 29.
113. Roger Cotterell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 709; David Nelken, Defining and Using R
the Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 69, at R
109.
114. Ralf Michaels, Rechtskultur, in HANDWO¨RTERBUCH ZUM EUROPA¨ISCHEN PRIVA-
TRECHT, supra note 81 at 1249 (2009); English translation forthcoming. R
115. Alain Bernard, Law and Economics, une science idiote?, 2008 RECUEIL DALLOZ
2806.
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although a proper understanding of local culture is necessary for suc-
cessful law reform, an overemphasis on culture holds us back in
achieving progress in the law altogether. For example, the fear of
comparative lawyers that Western laws are incompatible with Afri-
can values and culture tends to disregard that Africans may in fact
want to reap the benefits of taking part in Western culture—espe-
cially so after globalization has already made it impossible for them
to live some autochthonous culture in isolation from the rest of the
world. The French emphasis on culture as against the Doing Business
reports could be viewed as mere protectionism, were it not coupled
with projects to show that French law actually does perform better
than is claimed.116
Second, culture need not be anathema to economic analysis.117
From an economic perspective, culture can be conceptualized as an
informal constraint,118 or as path dependency. Anthony Ogus has ex-
plained culture as an obstacle to regulatory competition.119 Most
economists, however, take a more neutral position: they try to mea-
sure cultural preferences in different societies as one factor that will
determine what kind of legal system is most appropriate.120 In a re-
cent paper, a number of American and French economists (among
them one of the legal origins authors) try to demonstrate an interre-
lation between high degrees of regulation and a high level of mutual
distrust in society: the more people distrust each other the more they
rely on regulation, and the more they invoke regulation the more
they create distrust in society.121 At the end of their essay they ad-
dress the relation between their paper and the legal origins thesis
and thus the question of how law and culture interrelate. We may
(and should) question whether economics gets culture right, but it
would be an exaggeration to think that economics leaves no place for
culture.
The problem with the absence of culture in the legal origins liter-
ature is more indirect. Although culture need not figure in each
project and although it can theoretically be conceptualized in eco-
nomic terms, the fact that the debate about law reform is held in
economic terms means in fact that cultural specificities tend to be
116. Fauvarque-Cosson & Kerhuel, supra note 29, at 818-19.
117. Similarly Pierre Legrand, Book Review, 56 CAM. L. REV. 638, 640 (1997) (but
see now Legrand, supra note 87). More generally, see EELKE DE JONG, CULTURE AND R
ECONOMICS—ON VALUES, ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (2009).
118. DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 36-45 (1990).
119. Anthony Ogus, The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and Monopoli-
zation, 22 OX. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 419 (2002).
120. See, especially, Amir Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule
of Law and other Norms of Governance, 35 J. OF COMP. ECON. 659 (2007).
121. Philippe Aghion et al., Regulation and Distrust, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1324264.
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disregarded. Coding does not lend itself easily to proper understand-
ing of culture. This is true for the cultures in recipient countries,
especially insofar as early Doing Business reports proclaimed a “one
size fits all” approach. Yet it is true also, and perhaps even more im-
portantly, for the culture of donor countries and the cultural
contingencies of their laws.122 One of the core goals of comparative
law is understanding our own law—and culture—in relation to other
laws. U.S. law is often declared to be exceptional, without real com-
parison to back up this claim. The legal origins literature favors the
opposite extreme: U.S. law is established as the benchmark, the goal
of legal convergence, the end of (legal) history. Comparative lawyers
retain the task to highlight the cultural contingency also of U.S. law
and its constructs—and of the particular approach to comparative
law as established in the legal origins literature.123
At the same time, however, the legal origins literature may pro-
vide a healthy antidote to the risk of overemphasis on legal culture in
comparative law. Often, we use legal culture as a fancy and conve-
niently imprecise shorthand for all kinds of aspects we cannot or do
not want to express more explicitly. Studies that ignore culture or,
worse, operationalize it in the way the legal origins literature does,
pressure us to express more precisely what we mean by culture and
why we think economists do not account for it accurately. Such pres-
sure can only be helpful for comparative law.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF COMPARATIVE LAW
What follows from all of this for the relation between compara-
tive law and economics? A first response would be the prediction or
even promotion that economics now replaces comparative law. The
authors of the legal origins literature would then have made true for
comparative law what Justice Holmes famously proclaimed almost
exactly one hundred years earlier, in 1897, namely that “the man of
the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.”124
The amazing political success of both the legal origins thesis and the
Doing Business reports may suggest as much, especially when com-
pared with the declining political importance of comparative law,125
at least outside European private law harmonization.126  However,
122. Of course, the economic approach itself represents a particular culture as
well.
123. On this, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Comparative Law and the Legal Ori-
gins Thesis: “[N]on scholae sed vitae discimus,” 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 863 (2009).
124. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 459, at 469
(1897).
125. Mathias Siems, The End of Comparative Law, 2 J. COMP. L. 133 (2007); see
already Ralf Michaels, Im Westen nichts Neues, 66 RABELSZ 97, 112-15 (2002); Rei-
mann, supra note 45, at 685-90. R
126. On European private law as a success story of comparative law, Reimann,
supra note 45, at 690-95; on the limited role of comparative law as only one of the R
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such demise of comparative law in favor of economics is unlikely.
First, comparative law will maintain an important role outside the
instrumentalism of politics and law reform, a role that economics and
the social sciences will not challenge. Second it can already be ob-
served that the economic approach to legal origins depends on better
comparative law understanding. The fear of comparative law’s de-
mise is a sign more of the field’s own perpetual angst than of the
threat from other disciplines.127 At least, comparative law should
survive as a necessary basis for the new comparative economics.
The opposite response would be to dismiss the legal origins liter-
ature as so seriously deficient from a comparative law perspective
that it is irrelevant for comparative lawyers. This would be exagger-
ated, too. To some extent such deficiencies are not surprising, given
that the legal origins literature is explicitly economic, not legal in its
focus. Moreover, within the discipline of economics, an intensive de-
bate is ongoing on the specific economic values and shortcomings of
the literature.128 This debate connects with the broader debate
within economics whether the reductionism of neoclassical econom-
ics, which underlies the legal origins literature, should not be at least
supplemented with other methods.129 And this debate, in turn, sug-
gests that some of the concerns of comparative lawyers find their
parallels in economics; thus a conversation should be possible. On the
one hand, even good economics will hardly ever be good legal analysis
(just as good legal analysis does not amount to good law), because
economics answers different questions and uses different method-
ological tools.130 On the other hand, economics must be of interest to
us comparative lawyers precisely because these different questions
and tools enrich our own perspective. The newly reemerged interest
of economists in law is something we comparative lawyers should
cherish and support, not dismiss.
This suggests a third response: stronger interdisciplinarity be-
tween economics and comparative law. Such interdisciplinarity has a
longer tradition than is often acknowledged. Three years prior to the
publication of Justice Holmes’ quote about the man of the future,131
economists and lawyers had founded an “International Association of
factors in European private law, Reinhard Zimmermann, Comparative Law and the
Europeanization of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
supra note 7, at 539, 577-78; Ralf Michaels, Rechtsvergleichung, in HANDWO¨RTERBUCH R
ZUM EUROPA¨ISCHEN PRIVATRECHT, supra note 81, at 1260; English translation R
forthcoming.
127. Curran, supra note 123. R
128. See the references in La Porta et al., supra note 17; see also KENNETH DAM, R
THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006).
129. For one such proposal, see TONY LAWSON, REORIENTING ECONOMICS (2003).
130. See Ralf Michaels, Economics of Law as Choice of Law, 71 L.&CONTEMP.
PROBS. 73 (2008).
131. Holmes, supra note 124. R
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Comparative Legal Science and Economics” in Berlin, the predeces-
sor of today’s German Comparative Law Association.132 Much of the
organization’s inaugural article still holds true today: “If now, as is
appropriate, lawyers and economists will carry the bulk of the work
necessary for further regulation of social conditions, they must step
out of their national isolation and join forces in international associa-
tions.”133 The article expressed the need for comparative law and
comparative economics to join forces in order to improve general wel-
fare in the world. Admittedly, little of this proximity between
economics and comparative law has remained. In the United States,
the neoclassical law and economics of the Chicago school that has
come to dominate law and economics is, in its abstraction, largely
ahistorical and noncomparative.134 In Europe, legal scholarship in
general has become anathema to economic theory altogether (a differ-
ence to the United States that has led to lots of speculation about the
reasons).135 A puzzling amnesia has eradicated almost all memory of
European law and economics around the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury; law and economics is now almost exclusively viewed as an
import from the United States.136 Most importantly for this essay,
current comparative law on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean is almost
completely devoid of economics. The leading coursebooks do not men-
tion it at all (and none, curiously, address the legal origins
literature).137 Comparative Law encyclopedias contain chapters, but
none is really comprehensive.138 And the three-volume collection on
132. ELMAR WADLE, EINHUNDERT JAHRE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE GESELLSCHAFTEN
IN DEUTSCHLAND 32-42 (1994).
133. Franz Bernho¨ft, Unser Zweck, 1 JAHRBUCH DER INTERNATIONALEN VER-
EINIGUNG FU¨R VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT UND VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE ZU
BERLIN 1, 12 (1895).
134. Ron Harris, The Uses of History in Law and Economics, 4 THEORETICAL IN-
QUIRIES IN LAW 659, 666-74 (2004). But see the occasional comparative remarks in
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55, 164-65, 204-05,
223, 243, 247, 249, 267 (2004).
135. Christian Kirchner, The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Ger-
many, 11 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 277 (1991); Viktor Winkler,
Review Essay—Some Realism about Rationalism: Economic Analysis of Law in Ger-
many, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1033 (2005); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis of Law in
North America, Europe and Israel, 3 REV. L. & ECON. Issue 2 article 11 (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol3/iss2/art11; Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin
Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Econom-
ics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295 (2008); Nuno
Garoupa & Thomas S. Ulen The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in
Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555 (2008).
136. E.g. Roland Kirstein, Law and Economics in Germany, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 160 (B. Bouckaert & G. de Geest eds., 2000), available at http://
encyclo.findlaw.com/0330book.pdf. But see Viktor Winkler, O¨konomische Analyse des
Rechts im 19. Jahrhundert: Victor Matajas “Recht des Schadensersatzes” revisited, 26
ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R NEUERE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 262 (2004).
137. One exception is now UGO A.MATTEI ET AL., SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW.
CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 13-31, 267 (7th ed. 2009).
138. Florian Faust, Comparative Law and Economic Analysis of Law, in THE OX-
FORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 7, at 837; Raffaele Caterina, R
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“Comparative Law and Economics” (2004) is symptomatically edited
by two law and economics scholars and contains mainly articles by
economists.139
The legal origins literature provides a welcome incentive for re-
newed interdisciplinarity between economics and comparative law.
The previous section has shown several avenues for such fruitful in-
terdisciplinarity. A project centered at the University of Cambridge
takes such input from comparative law to heart. The project, which
combines lawyers and economists, aims for better measurements of
law’s effect on economics by working with a more accurate under-
standing of laws and of functional equivalents.140 And yet, ultimately
economics and comparative law will likely remain separate at least to
some degree. First, law remains, at some stage, too complex to be
measured.141 The attraction of economics lies in the reduction of such
complexity to manageable data;142 the attraction of comparative law,
by contrast, lies in the emphasis that law remains, at some stage,
irreducibly complex. Second, lawyer-economists tend to take an
outside view of the law. Maybe this perspective need not go so far as
to view law as ideology, as LLS claim. Nonetheless, the internal per-
spective of lawyers must likely remain inaccessible to economics as a
social science interested in observable data.
This suggests that we comparative lawyers should take up the
dialogue with lawyer-economists. We can and should contribute com-
plexity and accuracy to their projects, which may help them towards
a more accurate understanding on the actual operation of law and of
legal transplants. In turn, we can learn from them about the mea-
surement of empirical facts and about how to simplify and
operationalize the results. Even more importantly perhaps, we can
learn how to use academic findings towards influencing political and
economic decisions. Our criticism of the simplicity and false reduc-
tionism of the rankings in the Doing Business reports misses the
most important goal of these rankings: to grab attention, especially
Comparative Law and Economics, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
supra note 70, at 161; Anthony Ogus, The Economic Approach: Competition between
Legal Systems, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 69, at 155 (Esin O¨ru¨cu¨
& David Nelken eds., 2007). See also Ugo Mattei & Fabrizio Cafaggi, Comparative
Law and Economics, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
346 (P. Newman ed., 1998); Ugo A. Mattei, Luisa Antoniolli and Andrea Rossato,
Comparative Law and Economics, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra
note 136, at 505, available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/0560book.pdf. R
139. COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (Gerrit De Geest & Roger Van den Bergh
eds., 3 Vols., 2004).
140. Armour et al., supra note 16. R
141. Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of
the Doing Business Project, 32 L. & SOCIAL INQ. 1095, 1104-05 (2007); Michaels, supra
note 50, at 210-11. R
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when one is talking to lay consumers who want simplifications of the
data.
And yet, after all, the challenge from economics forces us to be-
come aware, again, of the specificity of our own knowledge. We have
long flirted with the idea that comparative law is “really” not law but
something else—comparative sociology perhaps, comparative cul-
tural studies, now perhaps comparative economics. If this were so,
then comparative lawyers would ultimately be irrelevant: compara-
tive sociology is better performed by sociologists, economists are
better at comparative economics than are comparative lawyers. At
the same time, all these disciplines have an inadequate understand-
ing of laws and their comparison. It is this specific legal knowledge of
the law that we comparative lawyers have, and in the end, the legal
origins literature and the Doing Business reports show how impor-
tant this specific knowledge actually is.
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